Interference, Contracts and Authority with Insecure Communication

No abstract.

PeerPigeon: A Web Application to Support Generalised Peer Review

Peer Review (also known as Peer Assessment) is an important technique in learning, but can be difficult to support through e-learning due to the complexity and variety of peer review processes. In this paper we present PeerPigeon, a Web 2.0 style application that supports generalised Peer Review by using a canonical model of Peer Review based on a Peer Review Pattern consisting of Peer Review Cycles, each defined in terms of Peer Review Transforms. We also demonstrate how PeerPigeon makes use of a Domain Specific Language based on Ruby to define these plans, and thus cope with the irreducible complexity of the flow of documents around a peer network

Competitive Prices and Organizational Choices

We construct a price-theoretic model of integration decisions and show that these choices may adversely affect consumers, even in the absence of monopoly power in supply and product markets. Integration is costly to implement but is effective at coordinating production decisions. The price of output helps to determine the organizational form chosen: there is an inverted-U relation between the degree of integration and product prices. Moreover, organizational choices affect output: integration is more productive than non-integration at low prices, and less productive at high prices. Since shocks to industries affect product prices, reorganizations are likely to take place in coordinated fashion and be industry specific, consistent with the evidence. Since the price range in which integration maximizes productivity generally differs from the one in which it maximizes managerial welfare, organizational choices will often be second-best inefficient. We show that there are instances in which entry of low-cost suppliers can hurt consumers by changing the terms of trade in the supplier market, thereby inducing reorganizations that raise prices.

Managerial Firms, Vertical Integration, and Consumer Welfare

We show that vertical integration decisions of managers may affect adversely consumers even in the absence of monopoly power in either supply or product markets. This effect is most likely to come about when demand is initially high and there is a negative supply shock or when demand is low and there is a positive demand shock. The results are robust to the introduction of active shareholders and to other extensions.

Competing for Ownership

We develop a tractable model of the allocation of ownership and control in firms in competitive markets that permits study of how the scarcity of assets in the market translates into control allocations inside the organization. The model identifies a price-like mechanism whereby local liquidity or productivity shocks propagate and lead to widespread organizational restructuring. Firms will be more integrated when the terms of trade are more favorable to the short side of the market, when liquidity is unequally distributed among existing firms and following a uniform increase in productivity. Shocks to the first two moments of the liquidity distribution have multiplier effects on the corresponding moments of the distribution of ownership.

Trade Liberalization and Organizational Choice

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country, perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms. In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate their firms, trading off the pecuniary benefits of coordinating production decisions with the private benefits of operating in their preferred ways. The price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it affects the size of the pecuniary benefits. In particular, non-integration is chosen at "low" and "high" prices, while integration occurs only at moderate prices. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets, which affect the division of surplus between managers. We obtain three main results. First, joint product and factor market integration leads to the convergence of organization design across countries. Second, even in the absence of factor movements, the price changes triggered by liberalization of product markets can lead to significant organizational restructuring within countries. Third, the removal of barriers to factor mobility can induce further organizational changes, sometimes adversely affecting consumers, which suggests a potential complementarity between trade policy and corporate governance policy.

Trade Liberalization and Organizational Change

We embed a simple incomplete-contracts model of organization design in a standard two-country perfectly-competitive trade model to examine how the liberalization of product and factor markets affects the ownership structure of firms. In our model, managers decide whether or not to integrate their firms, trading off the pecuniary benefits of coordinating production decisions with the private benefits of operating in their preferred ways. The price of output is a crucial determinant of this choice, since it affects the size of the pecuniary benefits. In particular, non-integration is chosen at “low” and “high” prices, while integration occurs at moderate prices. Organizational choices also depend on the terms of trade in supplier markets, which affect the division of surplus between managers. We obtain three main results. First, even when firms do not relocate across countries, the price changes triggered by liberalization of product markets can lead to significant organizational restructuring within countries. Second, the removal of barriers to factor mobility can lead to inefficient reorganization and adversely affect consumers. Third, “deep integration” the liberalization of both product and factor markets ­ leads to the convergence of organizational design across countries.Firms, Contracts, Globalization

[N]pT ensemble and finite-size scaling study of the GEM-4 critical isostructural transition

First-order transitions of system where both lattice site occupancy and lattice spacing fluctuate, such as cluster crystals, cannot be efficiently studied by traditional simulation methods. These methods necessarily fix one of these two degrees of freedom, but this difficulty is surmounted by the generalized [N]pT ensemble [J. Chem. Phys. 136, 214106 (2012)]. Here it is shown that histogram reweighting and the [N]pT ensemble can be used to study an isostructural transition between cluster crystals of different occupancy in the generalized exponential model of index 4 (GEM-4). Extending this scheme to finite-size scaling studies also allows to accurately determine the critical point parameters and to verify that it belongs to the Ising universality class.Comment: 5 pages, 4 figure

Field Independence and Cognitive Flexibility in Creative Test Performance

Much research in recent years has been devoted to the identification and measurement of creative abilities. It was postulated that Werner\u27s orthogenetic principle, in which development is conceptualized as proceeding from a state of relative lack of differentiation of functions to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration of functions, might be applied to cognitive development in order to provide a useful model for investigating such abilities. A parallel interest of the investigator was the use of the Stroop Color-Word Test as a measure of hierarchic integration of cognitive functions (here called cognitive flexibility). Three hundred and fifty-nine subjects were screened in order to identify three groups of individuals: those both highly differentiated (as inferred from level of perceptual fieldindependence) and highly flexible (HFI-HCF), who were hypothesized to be the most creative; those highly differentiated but exhibiting low flexibility (HFI-LCF), who were hypothesized to exhibit moderate levels of creativity; those exhibiting low differentiation and low flexibility (LFI-LCF), who were hypothesized to be the least creative. However, when these identified subjects were administered the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking and the Otis- Gamma intelligence test (to assess the contribution of intelligence to creativity) this hypothesis was not borne out. In fact, the HFI-LCF subjects performed most creatively, followed by the HFI-HCF and then the LFI-LCF subjects, although none of the five creativity score differences were found to be statistically significant. These results were discussed in terms of possible methodological and conceptual shortcomings and suggestions for future research were advanced

Wealth Effects, Distribution and the Theory of Organization

We construct a general equilibrium model of firm formation in which organization is endogenous. Firms are coalitions of agents providing effort and investment capital. Effort is unobservable unless a fixed monitoring cost is paid, and borrowing is subject to a costly state verification problem. Because incentives vary with an agents wealth, different types of agents become attractive firm members under different circumstances. When borrowing is not costly, firms essentially consist of one type of agent and are organized efficiently. But when the costly state verification problem is sufficiently severe, firm organization will depend on the distribution of wealth: with enough inequality, it will tend to be dictated by incentives of rich agents to earn high returns to wealth, even if the chosen organizational form is not a technically efficient way to provide incentives